Poland’s contemporary national security: the goals of the national security strategy

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Л. Донай
Особое место, среди документов, описывающих политику безопасности государства, занимает стратегия национальной безопасности (безопасности государства). Это действующая в стране концепция обеспечения её безопасности, содержащая, в особенности, идентификацию национальных интересов и стратегических целей, оценку будущего формирования политической среды безопасности, а также правила и способы достижения стратегических целей в предполагаемых условиях (реализации операционных заданий), а также подготовки (удержании и трансформации) системы национальной безопасности (реализации подготовительных заданий). Стратегия Национальной Безопасности это важнейший документ, касающийся безопасности и обороны РП. Её принимает правительство, а утверждает президент. Стратегия является основой для разработки более подробных документов, таких как, например, политико-
стратегическая оборонная директива. В данной статье представлены концепции новейшей Стратегии Безопасности Р П. Новая Стратегия Национальной Безопасности Польши документирует наиболее серьёзное до этого момента изменение в национальной политике безопасности — основывающееся на принятии к сведению наивысшими властями страны и запись в стратегический документ, что впервые с момента обретения независимости в 1989 году, нам может угрожать война.
L. Donaj
A special place among the documents on national security policy takes a national security strategy (state security). It is a concept implemented in a state ensuring its security, containing in particular identification of national interests and strategic objectives, assessment of the future shaping of the strategic security environment, and rules and ways of achieving the strategic objectives in the predicted conditions (realisation of operational tasks), as well as preparations (maintenance and transformation) of the national security system (realisation of preparative tasks). The National Security Strategy is the most important document on the security and defence of the Republic of Poland. It is adopted by the government and approved by the president. The strategy is the basis for the development of more detailed documents such as the political and strategic defence directive. This paper presents the goals of the latest version of the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. The new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland documents the most serious change in the national security policy so far, involving the acknowledgement by the highest authorities of the country and saving in a strategic document that, for the first time since independence in 1989, we may be threatened with war.
Ключевые слова:
стратегия национальной безопасности, приоритеты политики безопасности, конфликты регионального и локального характера.
Key words:
national security strategy, security policy priorities, regional and local conflicts.
The instinct of looking for security has its roots in the beginning of the animated world and forms an essential element of continuity of its evolution. It concerns individuals as well as groups. The security paradigm permeates all spheres of life and international order. It changes together with them. The progress of civilization and the growing range of dangers influence a contemporary understanding of security [6, p. 187].
Security is a concept that is dynamic, ambiguous, and multi-faceted, difficult to define in a way not questionable to representatives of various streams of research in the study of international relations. The dynamic of the concept expresses mostly the active nature of international relations. They therefore should be treated as a time-varying process, not as a state of unchanging designata and parameters. The variability of the term also reflects the multiplicity and diversity of historically shaped models of (national and international) security. In addition, the dynamic of security expresses the character of the priorities that are formulated in the process of the conceptualisation of its model at different time and space (territorial integrity or the survival of the nation or state, or universal or regional, universal or common). The latter division indicates a variability of security models in international relations undergoing & quot-aging"- under the influence of scientific and technical progress occurring at an accelerating pace [3, p. 42]. The ambiguity of the concept of security is captured most fully in the wide range of values, needs, and states that it identifies. They are not only sovereignty, national identity (in relation to state), and cultural identity (in relation to different civilisations), but also existence, survival, quality of life, independence, as well as a variety of conditions that states and the world are in, and thus stability, confidence, and the state of security. The conceptual ambiguity of security also refers to the subjective dimension. An individual, the nation, the state, the international community are all the subject of security to the same degree. Therefore we are not talking about security as a whole, but national (state) and international security. The complexity of the concept of security signals its military, economic, ecological, and cultural dimension, revealing a wealth of content included in it. The multidimensional nature of
security also expresses the civilisation challenges of the contemporary world that states face to make their national and international security a lasting value in international relations [3, p. 42].
According to a traditional definition, security is freedom from threats posing a risk to the survival of the state. The broad definition of security threats in turn includes any action or sequence of events that threaten citizens'- quality of life in a short period of time or restrict the scope for political choices made by the institutions of the state. Therefore, among others, it is important to protect political order and the freedom to choose the path of development of society and the state [2, p. 17]. Walter Lipman stressed the preservation of the values, because to him, a nation is safe as long as it does not have to sacrifice its own values and is able, if necessary, to defend them in armed struggle [9].
Each state considers the desire to ensure its security and sovereignty to be the highest good. Until recently, the one factor that in particular — and sometimes alone — influenced the evolution of security was military power. Today, using military power cannot be unpunished, for even states with the most modern weapons cannot use them freely without considering the consequences of such use, which will be the risk of possible retaliation. In addition to the military factor, there are a number of others to be taken into account such as economic, technological, financial, ecological, or modern means of information [1, p. 37]. States considering them shape their security policies understood as part of the overall national policy concerning projects related to the development and use of defence capabilities in order to prevent and deal with all kinds of threats [5, p. 92]. The condition of security of a state is subject to changes in degree and proportion corresponding to the change that occurs in the international environment [4, p. 75]. In turn the condition and sum of security of each and all states — members of the international community — form the basis of international security. Its foundation is a set of conditions, norms, principles, rules of conduct, and international mechanisms giving states to a greater or a lesser extent a sense of undisputed existence, survival, and free development [4, p. 6].
A special place among the documents on national security policy takes a national security strategy (state security). It is a concept implemented in a state ensuring its security, containing in particular identification of national interests and strategic objectives, assessment of the future shaping of the
strategic security environment, and rules and ways of achieving the strategic objectives in the predicted conditions (realisation of operational tasks), as well as preparations (maintenance and transformation) of the national security system (realisation of preparative tasks) [16]. The strategic objectives of a state in the field of security will be called operationalised national interests, or — resulting from the disaggregation of individual national interests, performed in the context of specific (current and projected) strategic security conditions as well as needs and opportunities (strategic potential of the state) — future states, phenomena, and processes in the area of security, desirable from the standpoint of those interests- as opposed to national interests, which are a relatively constant category, strategic aims relate to specific conditions in a given historical period of the entity'-s existence- are achieved by enforcing the security policy [16].
The National Security Strategy is the most important document on the security and defence of the Republic of Poland. It is adopted by the government and approved by the president. The strategy is the basis for the development of more detailed documents such as the political and strategic defence directive [14].
The current strategy is from 2007, the new one has been formulated on the basis of the findings of the National Security Strategic Review (NSSR) conducted in the years 2011−12. The NSSR indicated, among others, the need to shift emphasis in building defence capabilities, and the inclusion of cyber security. An interministerial team was appointed to develop a new national security strategy in September 2013 [10- 14].
The National Security Council discussed the objectives of the strategy in October 2013. President Komorowski insisted at the time that the document would reflect & quot-the decided shift in national security accents and military development visions. "- & quot-Under the assumption that the priority is our territorial safety, our credibility within the North Atlantic Alliance, and the ability to ensure the territorial safety of all the member states, we will strive for future tasks connected with involvement outside the alliance to involve the use of potential built with the aim of defending our own territory. We are moving away from the expeditionary policy,& quot- said the president [14].
In March 2014, speaking at yearly briefing of senior officers of the Ministry of National Defence and Polish Armed Forces, the president stressed that it was necessary to finalise the work on the new national security strat-
egy and prepare a draft political and strategic defence directive, which should be ready by the end of the year [14].
On 21 October 21, 2014, the Council of Ministers adopted the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, developed on the basis of principles of the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland [12]. The strategy must still be approved by President Komorowski [13].
It was indicated in the document that Polish security will depend on its ability to effectively pursue national interests and achieve strategic objectives in the current and projected security conditions. Europe'-s security will be determined by four main factors: NATO, EU, U.S. strategic presence on the European continent, and relations with Russia. It was stressed that the rebuilding of Russia'-s power position at the expense of its neighbours and the severity of the confrontational policy of the Russian Federation, as exemplified by the conflict with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, negatively impinge on the security situation in the region. It was estimated that in the Polish neighbourhood there is a risk of conflict of regional and local character, which could engage Poland directly or indirectly. Poland is not free from political pressure using military argument either. In its immediate vicinity there is a high concentration of military power potential. The threats that Poland faces may in certain circumstances take on a non-military and a military character. In the case of military threats they can take the form of threats of crisis and war, that is, armed conflicts of different scale — from military action (below the threshold of classic war) to a less likely conflict on a large scale [17].
The document, referring to our national interests, presented strategic objectives in the field of Polish security. It outlined the need for sustainable internationalisation and autonomy in terms of the security of our country, including increased strategic resilience to various threats. It sets out three security policy priorities:
1. ensuring readiness and demonstrating determination to act in the field of security and defence, as well as strengthening national defence capabilities, with special treatment of the areas of national security where allied actions may be hindered-
2. supporting processes needed to reinforce NATO'-s ability to collective defence, developing the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU,
strengthening strategic partnerships (also with the U.S.) and strategic relationships with partners in the region-
3. supporting and participating selectively in actions of the international community, conducted under rules of international law, aimed at preventing the emergence of new sources of threats, responding to crises underway, and counteracting their spread [17].
Priority 1
Poland'-s strategic efforts will focus mainly on ensuring the safety of its own citizens and the territory of the state, supporting the defence of the allies, and then on participating in responding to threats beyond the allied territory [17].
Priority 2
Poland will support the consolidation of NATO around the defensive function, including strategic strengthening of the eastern flank of the alliance. Polish state action will also aim to deepen EU integration processes in order for the Union to have adequate security capabilities, including defence ones. It also is in Poland'-s interests to reinforce political cohesion and to increase efficiency of actions. Among strategic partnerships of Poland, the priority significance is attributed to the cooperation with the U.S. We will support efforts to preserve the U.S. security guarantee for Europe, the U.S. military presence in Europe, including Poland. The strategy also envisages developing close cooperation with its neighbours and building partnerships with other countries, including prevention and resolution of conflicts and international crises. In relations with Russia it will be important to solve difficult matters in conformity with rules of international law [17].
Priority 3
Its implementation requires, among others, the reinforcement of the United Nations, continuation of efforts for rules of international law to be revised, and strengthening of the effectiveness of regimes and regulations in the area of arms control and disarmament, including security and confidence-building measures. At a regional level, there is a need to reconstruct the importance of the OSCE. According to the adopted priorities, Poland organises and conducts strategic defensive actions, protective actions, and actions in the domain of social and economic security [17].
The substance of defensive actions is a maintenance and demonstration of readiness to effectively respond to military threats to the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Poland. The aim of protective measures is
to ensure conditions to maintain constitutional order, internal stability of the state, public security, and public order, both common and individual tangible and intangible resources, as well as the functioning of critical infrastructure. The substance of social actions in the domain of security is to create safe conditions allowing citizens to live a decent life. Key actions include: the protection of the national heritage, comprising a guarantee of the possibility of its safe development, especially in the economic, social, and intellectual sphere and provision of support for the national security system [17].
The document also identifies a number of strategic preparatory actions, combining within the national security system its military and non-military, internal and external components. They will regard: integration of the national security management subsystem- professionalisation of operational (defence and protection) subsystems- comprehensive preparation of (social and economic) support subsystems. Key tasks are related to the establishment of legal and organisational basis of the integrated national security system, as well as the implementation of political and strategic rules and procedures for national security management that would be uniform under all conditions of security of the state [17].
The strategy should be considered together with other documents. They include the mentioned Act of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland (Dz. U. [Polish Journal of Laws] of 2012, items 461, 1101, 1407 [19]), but also the planned Political and Strategic Defence Directive and Cyber Security Doctrine of the Republic of Poland [15]. Also, one should not forget about the so-called Komorowski Doctrine. It is an informal definition of the policies pursued by President Bronistaw Komorowski relating to national security strategy (in particular to tasks of the armed forces) and expressed in a shift of priorities away from external engagement towards tasks related to immediate security (defence) of the state (nation, territory, resources). The doctrine is based on the experiences and recommendations of the conducted National Security Strategic Review. Its theses were contained in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, published in 2013 [7- 8].
The main provisions of this doctrine are as follows:
1. The strategic priorities of the Republic of Poland should be shifted away from expeditionary missions towards tasks related to the provision of immediate safety, including defence of the state.
Poland'-s significant external military involvement during the last decade (whose symbol is the operation in Afghanistan) and the development of military capabilities in this regard limited possibilities for optimal preparation of the armed forces to carry out their most important constitutional task, that is, immediate security, including in particular state defence (the nation as a whole, citizens, territory, and resources). Therefore, it is in Poland'-s interest to do a U-turn in thinking about the priorities for the armed forces and shift them towards defensive tasks. What should be noted is that the doctrine does not imply withdrawal from participation in foreign missions. It only calls for giving them a proper place in the hierarchy of tasks for the state and the armed forces [8].
2. Our own defence potential is a pillar and guarantee of our security.
Participation in alliances, particularly NATO, is an important pillar supporting our external security. But the most important one is our own defence capabilities. It is therefore essential that the level of national defence expenditure remains 1. 95 per cent of the GDP, which should be optimally spent in the first place on strengthening the capabilities needed to defend our own state (nation, territory, and resources) or the territory of NATO allies. Such defensive capabilities should be our national specialty in NATO, and they should primarily be brought to the common alliance potential. Non-military capabilities of the state (public institutions, private entities, citizens) should be developed in parallel to operate in hazardous conditions in order to build an integrated (common) national security system [8].
3. Poland'-s specialisation in NATO and the EU should also be, in addition to the ability to defend the territory, anti-surprise attack measures necessary especially in situations difficult to result in a consensus.
Poland, as a NATO and an EU border state is particularly vulnerable to sudden, unexpected, selective threats on a limited scale, that is, those that do not require a long and notable advance preparations, but may be an effective means of blackmail and exerting political and strategic pressure. Such threats do not necessarily have to demonstrate an intent to control the territory of Poland, but to inflict losses (so-called non-teritorial threats). For this reason, they create situations difficult to result in a consensus, or those in which the allies could have problems in reaching a timely consensus on the purpose, nature, and scale of the reaction. Accordingly, the alliance as a whole might not be able to respond quickly and effectively. Therefore, Poland should have a full
spectrum of national capabilities to resist this kind of threats (especially such capabilities as intelligence and reconnaissance, air defence, including missile defence, and military mobility, especially air one) [8].
4. Poland should strengthen its strategic subjectivity in the international arena, actively participating in the functioning of international organisations and their formation according to its own strategic interests.
With regard to NATO, it is in the Polish interest, after the end of the operation in Afghanistan, for the alliance to consolidate around the implementation of its core task of ensuring the immediate security of the Member States. In practical dimension, this should be expressed especially in continuous updating of contingency plans (plans of action in the event of aggression against a NATO member) and regular reviewing of these plans during allied military exercises, as well as proportional development of defence infrastructure. As for the EU, our efforts should aim at strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy in order to be the second, after NATO, outer pillar of strengthening Polish security. It is particularly important to adopt a real European security strategy as a necessary foundation for the empowerment of the EU in this field. Euro-Atlantic relations, including NATO-EU system cooperation, are also Poland'-s priority [8].
The head of the Polish National Security Bureau, General Stanistaw Koziej, secretary of the National Security Council, found & quot-creation of scenarios adequate to threats& quot- to be the most important thing in the strategy, especially in the doctrine, which will be prepared on its basis, & quot-It certainly should include situations involving threats below the threshold of regular war. We have response plans prepared for regular activities, large-scale aggression, and the conflict in Eastern Europe shows that methods of hidden sabotage which are not easy to assess whether this is already war might be very effective,& quot- said Koziej. In his opinion, the directive should specify tasks for all state structures, & quot-not only for the armed forces, but also for all ministries, all provincial governors, who have to write out these tasks. "- & quot-This directive must define realistic tasks for military and non-military structures of the state, compliant with the scenarios, to provide complete defence,& quot- said the head of the National Security Bureau in October 2014. He also stressed that the documents relating to defence must take into account both the need to work within NATO when its reaction can occur quickly, e.g., in response to
large war, and risks below the threshold of war, when the consent of all the members would take time [11].
& quot-Our ways of acting must take greater account of the need to act independently, especially in relation to asymmetric, selective, small-scale threats, which would be consensus-challenging,& quot- said Koziej. According to the head of NSB, it can be summed up as follows: If you want to count on someone, first count on yourself. Koziej pointed out that this reflection had appeared in the National Security Strategic Review more than two years earlier, together with the need to develop response mechanisms within NATO in such situations. Koziej stressed that under the influence of Polish suggestions and experience with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, NATO & quot-saw an emergence of this type of reflection& quot-. & quot-A picket, which we often talk about, should not appear when there already is a threat, but when there is a political assessment that such a threat is approaching. The alliance should be able to send troops to suppress intentions of a potential aggressor or security infringer,& quot- assessed Koziej. He considered it necessary & quot-to establish a formula for deterrence, discouraging a potential aggressor from entering the territory of the alliance with methods of creeping aggression below the threshold of was. "- & quot-How to deter a potential aggressor from such intentions is the challenge that the alliance faces. We realize this, especially as boundary states, because we are the most vulnerable to this type of threat,& quot- he added [11].
The new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland documents the most serious change in the national security policy so far, involving the acknowledgement by the highest authorities of the country and saving in a strategic document that, for the first time since independence in 1989, we may be threatened with war. The disclosed fragments of the new strategy — the whole thing awaits President Bronistaw Komorowski'-s signature — leave no doubt that the main threat to Polish security is Russia. The document, though it does not call it an enemy explicitly, accuses it of: & quot-rebuilding Russia'-s power position at the expense of its neighbourhood and increasing the severity of confrontational policies on the Russian Federation'-s part. "- Of course, the most important proof of this is to be the conflict in the east of Ukraine. The Russian government'-s policy is to pose a number of different military and non-military threats to Poland, & quot-Threats to our country in unfavourable circumstances may take on a non-military and a military character. In the latter case, they can take the form of threats of crisis and war, that is,
armed conflicts of different scale — from military action (below the threshold of classic war) to a less likely conflict on a large scale& quot-. War, according to the authors of the strategy, is thus unlikely, but-possible [18].
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