Эффективность политического взаимодействия власти и корпоративного бизнеса в постсоветской России: сравнительный анализ
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KHALILOV Timur A. ,
Scientific Journal & quot-Historical and Social-Educational Ideas& quot-,
Krasnodar, Russia tkhali lov86@gmail. com
EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATIVE BUSINESS POLITICAL COOPERATION IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
DOI: 10. 17 748/2075−9908−2016−8-2/1 -87−93
ХАЛИЛОВ Тимур Александрович, научный журнал «Историческая и социально-образовательная мысль», г. Краснодар, Россия tkhalilov86@gmail. com
ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТЬ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ ВЛАСТИ И КОРПОРАТИВНОГО БИЗНЕСА В ПОСТСОВЕТСКОЙ РОССИИ: СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ
Relevance of the research paper agenda is due to the proposition, that state and corporate business are the most high-status and excess-resource subjects of complex political process in the post-Soviet Russian Federation- their dispositions and strategies of political interaction practices largely dictate the type, regime, and model of political order. The novelty of marked research agenda is that the author attempting of comparative and neo-institutional analysis of interests and strategies of political interaction of political-economic subjects. Special attention in the scientific article devoted to the problem of efficiency of political interaction practice between government and corporate business. The article deals with such themes of research issues as the nature and typology of political interaction, institutional formats of political interaction, comparison of dispositions and strategies of interacting parties. Also, in a scientific paper interpreted the political-economic sources of power in post-Soviet Russia. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of power and domination through the prism of neo-institutional approach. This scientific article author argues that in contemporary Russia simultaneously coexist several institutional modes of interaction of political and economic power, which leads to emergence of the & quot-cage effect& quot- - the ability of state to & quot-capture"- of social actors, to dictate the style, shape and interaction mechanisms, to determine the resource potential of the agenda changes.
Актуальность темы научной статьи обусловлена тем суждением, что государство и корпоративный бизнес являются наиболее высокостатусными и сверхресурсными субъектами сложного политического процесса в постсоветской Российской Федерации- их диспозиции и стратегии в практиках политического взаимодействия во многом детерминируют тип, режим, модель политического порядка. Новизна обозначенной научно-исследовательской повестки заключается в том, что автором осуществляется попытка проведения компаративного и неоинституционального анализа интересов и стратегий политического взаимодействия данных субъектов политики. Особое внимание в научной статье уделено проблеме эффективности практик политического взаимодействия власти и корпоративного взаимодействия. В статье рассмотрены такие сюжеты исследовательской проблемы, как сущность и типология политического взаимодействия, институциональные форматы политического взаимодействия, сравнение диспозиций и стратегий взаимодействующих сторон. Также в научной статье интерпретированы политико-экономические источники власти в постсоветской России. Существенное внимание уделено анализу власти и господства сквозь призму неоинституционального подхода. Автор данной научной статьи утверждает, что в современной России одновременно сосуществует несколько институциональных режимов взаимодействия политической и экономической власти, что приводит к возникновению «эффекта клетки» — способности государства «захватывать» социальных акторов, диктовать им стиль, форму и механизмы взаимодействия, определять ресурсность повестки изменений.
Keywords: state, government, corporate business, political cooperation, efficiency of interaction, political-economic sources, counterparts of political interaction, post-Soviet Russia, contemporary Russia, comparative analysis, & quot-cage effect& quot-
Ключевые слова: государство, власть, корпоративный бизнес, политическое взаимодействие, эффективность взаимодействия субъектов, политико-экономические источники, контрагенты политического взаимодействия, постсоветская Россия, современная Россия, сравнительный анализ, «эффект клетки»
Arguments about the static and dynamic parameters of power relations in modern Russia to lead are not easy for several reasons. Firstly, the concept of power itself has many meanings. This category of political language, depending on the context, can mean a political system in general, the political-administrative class, and sector of human activity, etc. Secondly, due to external circumstances it is obvious that in the near future there will be (or is already happening) internal transformation processes in the Russian power relations system. Third, identify the turned off settings of Russian power space demands from researchers methodological appeal to its sources.
David West, speaking about the Hannah Arendt'-s phenomenology of political action, comes to the conclusion that & quot-the understanding of politics exclusively through sovereignty and rule leads … to ignore its essential nature activities that occur between people& quot- [1, p. 200]. Vladimir Nikitaev, fixing the analytical tradition of the study of the political as a strategy of power, points out that the German jurist and political theorist Karl Schmitt, & quot-draws attention to the terms of inter or even state and political identities, which moves as a special law, and the broad legal and sociological thought. So the first thing he finds it necessary to do is to postulate a difference between political, state and public to
specifying the concept of political independence, as the base (categorical), to determine the concept of state as a political unity and to establish its relationship with another kind of public associations, from the union to humanity& quot- [2, p. 116].
In the context of this research, we will be guided by one of the most common definitions of power, owned by American political scientist Robert Dahl: «A has power over B, if A is the cause of certain behavior of B, provided that without influence from the A, B would have behaved differently& quot- [ 3, p. 202−203]. In other words, the power is a causal relationship between those who ruled and those who are subservient, arising due to the presence of some A'-s resources: money, knowledge, social status, power, etc., as well as the ability to use the resources. Macro-sociology specialist Michael Mann, in his works distinguishes four sources of power: economic, militaristic, political and ideological. After World War II, the synthetic construct of political and economic sources prevail in the world. M. Mann said that authentic democracy is characterized by existence and independence of four sources of power from each other .
Russian researchers describe along with formal constitutional institutions, public authorities and local government, practices and procedures of the informal system of relations, interactions, customs, traditions and & quot-rules of the game& quot-. So, Yu.S. Pivovarov proposes the concept of & quot-Russian system& quot-, characterized by supreme power total domination over all other public life spheres, & quot-personified the supreme power& quot- that require & quot-mediating powers& quot- . The Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies'- Head D.V. Badovskiy, analyzing Russian modernization strategy, describes the & quot-state of triumphant bureaucracy& quot- that & quot-reveals more brightly corporative traits, all scrupulously regulates, builds hierarchies and vertical& quot- .
Chief Editor of Academic Journal & quot-World Economy and International Relations& quot-, leading researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Russian Academy of Sciences) A.V. Ryabov talks about the & quot-feudal archaic& quot- relations of power in Russia, which he removes from the conditional character of property, & quot-the official or implicit privileges of state bureaucracy& quot-, reflection of & quot-the transit society unwillingness to further change& quot- .
O.E. Bessonova constructs the concept of & quot-distributing economy& quot-, in which the relations of property and wealth are managed by non-market and/or non-legal mechanisms, and so-called & quot-official work& quot- - the bureaucracy, which dominates, prevails and stands above the business .
Actuality of the scientific article theme dues to the following reasons: political interaction of government and corporate business is the important channel of conventional participation of civil society in political process and the method of compromise negotiation of group political interests. Such cooperation in a democracy suggests an open and sustained dialogue between politics actors as a condition for the optimal balance between stability and innovation development.
Russian corporate business role in the political interaction with the government identified in the monographs of S.P. Peregudov  A.V. Pavroz , and also in scientific papers of A.D. Bogaturov , V.Y. Fokin , E.N. Kostina . Attention of political scientists is focused on the corporate business strategies. At the same time interests, strategies and disposition of Russian state authorities by interaction with big business are studied much weaker.
In this article we will attempt to determine based on the binary comparative analysis of the political cooperation interests and strategy of government and corporate business in post-Soviet Russian. The chronological framework of the study is from summer of 2003 to the present. It is & quot-the Yukos case& quot- marked the transition of federal officials to limit anti-system opposition of big business, to create a relatively complete system of state corporatism.
The theoretical basis for the study is subject-activity approach, combined with sociological neo-institutionalism. Using this research option opens up the possibility to identify the real interests of political interaction counterparties, their disposition and positioning in political system, institutions and practices, resources of influence and policies. Typology of political interaction between government and big business in Russia is regulated on the basis of important conclusions of S.P. Peregudov [14, p. 255−322], L.I. Nikovskaya and V.N. Yakimets [15, p. 27−35].
The essence of political interaction can be defined as a type of relationship between politics subjects in which they have a mutual influence on each other, share resources of power and influence. Political interaction is the condition of reproduction and development the political system functions. Political cooperation expresses the balance of interests and strategies of political actors included in political relations system. Political interactions reveal the disposition of political actors in the political
system, their interests, and goals of activity. Political interaction acts allow establishing procedures for the functioning and development of the political system.
The parameters of political interaction from a specific type of model of interaction of subjects are equal partnership kinds of relationships (consensus, agreement, union, unit, cooperation) or hierarchical relationships between the participants (domination, conflict management). The main purpose of political interaction in a democracy is coordination of interests of political actors, consensus and cooperation among them, matching their needs to preserve and to increase the level of political stability.
Institutional formats defined as the embodiment of political order in the society or its individual segments. Institutional formats are regulated in Russia in more informal conventions (agreements) of the subjects of political relations rather than legislation. They are maintained and reproduced by the political and cultural regulators: values, orientations, attitudes of activities. To claim the existence of formats is possible to due by typicality, inter-subjectivity, predictability of the strategies and tactics of political interaction between business and government. Institutional formats of political interaction design basic modes of existence of political actors, harmonize their interests in the competition for power and influence [16, p. 104−106].
According to well-known researcher of corporatism of S.P. Peregudov, & quot-the bureaucracy and big business — and separately, and together — are not the jurisdictions, which are developed and adopted by the most important and fateful for the country'-s political decisions. Moreover, those solutions which are developed within the framework of this subsystem enter into force only with the approval of the actual political institutions and actors, often incurring substantial correction. It is primarily the institute of President- and a group of influential liberal-minded politicians in the Government and the Presidential Administration, the top of the law enforcement agencies and regional authorities. This & quot-top floor& quot- of the political system, which relies on corporate-bureaucratic subsystem, spliced and interacts with it, but not subject to it, having broader political resources and priorities. So to call Russia corporate state and the & quot-state-corporation"-, in which rules corporate interest — it is not just a great exaggeration, but inappropriate interpretation of the principles being the basis political structure and political system of the country& quot-[17, p. 56−57].
The political scientist, chairman of the & quot-Center for Political Technologies& quot- B.I. Makarenko, thinking about neo-corporatism in contemporary Russia, reveals the key, in his view, problematic characteristics of the interaction of political and economic: (1) antagonistic contradictions in the transitional period- (2) weakness of the execution of judgments and arbitration mechanisms- (3) important role of government in the economy, its control over key resources- (4) Russia'-s political culture, which tends to & quot-non-activist"- [18, p. 92−94].
It looks like convincing evidence base judgments about the post-Soviet bureaucracy of political philosopher and political scientist, the author of the original concepts of state apparatus, political opposition, legitimacy of authorities, the founder of political conceptology V.P. Makarenko, who writes that & quot-stabilization of the bureaucracy is dysfunctional. Its features include: (1) parasitism on the social groups, institutions and government agencies- (2) interweaving of material interests with the exclusion of decisions to the top of the hierarchy- (3) prevalence of group interests and negative solidarity over the interests of the country'-s population- (4) creation of new structures is not to deal with new problems, and for the reproduction apparatus- (5) desire to get government subsidies at all costs. For any political decision hiding group interests apparatus (in the sphere of price and wage policy, fiscal and financial policy, economic and social incentives for production activity, and distribution of the national budget). Government group interest is dominating over interests of population& quot- [19, p. 301].
Given the presence of political and economic sources of power, on the one hand, and the existence of species interaction of political and economic, on the other hand, it is possible to construct a typology of forms of interaction between political and economic sources.
Table 1. Types of power sources interaction forms
Political Source Economic Source
Formal Interaction Formal Political Interaction Formal Economic Interaction
Informal Interaction Informal Political Interaction Informal Economic Interaction
However, these forms of interaction between political and economic power does not exist independently, autonomously and encapsulated. They interact with each other, thus creating institutional regimes of more complex level of political and economic power interaction. This institutional order describes the polysyllabic of political and economic power interaction.
Table 2. Institutional modes of political and economic power interaction
Formal Economic Interaction Informal Economic Interaction
Formal Political Interaction Pluralist Democracy Corporative Capitalism
Informal Political Interaction Government Capitalism Consensus Corruption
In contemporary Russia at the same time coexist several institutional modes of political and economic power interaction that just provides the possibility of the & quot-cage effect& quot- (the ability of officials to & quot-capture"- of social actors, to dictate style, shape and interaction mechanisms, to determine resource potential of agenda changes). In structural turbulent conditions Russian big business will behave heterogeneously . Politically active business-structures, supporting the democratization of contemporary Russia, will seek to break out of the & quot-cage"-, to shatter it from inside. Politically active business-structures, which do not support the democratization of contemporary Russia, will continue its active participation and resource support of major government projects. Politically passive business-structures, supporting the democratization of contemporary Russia, will be hardly noticeable in the Russian public space. And finally, politically passive business-structures, which do not support the democratization of contemporary Russia, will continue to practice corruption institutional mode of political and economic interaction by actions of their own. Government is interested to keep the status quo (the designed & quot-cage"- model), and will seek to use in their activity a plurality of technologies or even to increase repressiveness.
Leading researchers N.Y. Lapina and A.E. Chirikova fixed the following types of the political authorities and big business interaction in Russia: (1) patronage model (characterized the administrative regulation of business) — (2) partnership model (mutually beneficial interaction between government and big business) — (3) suppression model (confrontation between authorities and business) — (4) & quot-privatization of power& quot- model (ruling elite is formed and controlled by the business elite) [21, p. 192]. Depending on the extent of business elite representation in legislative authorities we can identify a number of models. The structure of the deputies can be described as balanced representation model, when the leading business groups are represented in the legislature more or less adequately to their role and influence. But it is possible unbalanced representation model, when large business groups are not represented or hardly represented in the legislative structures. Such situation is usually possible account of their political passivity.
Patronage model implies administrative and managerial attitude of local authorities towards to big business. This model is characterized by the active support of entrepreneurship of the governor, his protection until the actual splicing of business and government. As examples of such areas, in which prevails patronage model, we can fixe Saratov Region and Krasnodar Region.
Partnership model of business and government interaction was formed in those sectors and regions where the interaction counterparties are interested to conduct positive dialogue and to share different resources. It happens in territories such as Arkhangelsk and Chelyabinsk regions, the Republic of Tatarstan [21, p. 192].
& quot-Privatization of power& quot- model is firmly established in the regions where the group or groups of big business took over government structures or control over it. The main condition for fixing this model is the presence of consolidated economic elite, which alone forms the political elite. This model is characterized by a conflict with the political authorities and attempts to pressure on the government structures by the side of corporative business for satisfy their political and economic interests. The examples of this model are Moscow and the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia.
Suppression model occurred in areas with limited economic resources, whose livelihoods completely depend on getting of transfers from the Russian federal budget. A distinctive feature of these regions is weakness of political elites. The dependence on the federal government weakens the elite of the regions and strengthens the discontent of the local population. By way of example can be named Chukotka and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, Kamchatka Region [21, p. 192].
In post-Soviet Russia formed a & quot-vertical"-, the political-corporative model of political interaction between the political structures and big business. Government conducts the policy of interaction with
corporative business in order to improve their own legitimacy and to stabilize the Russian political system.
The parameters of the political strategy of Russian power in this area include (1) informal institutions and practices of social partnership- (2) priority role of authorities (formation of the partnership system from above) — (3) disengagement from the political control over the observance of the equal rights of the actors- (4) agreement of the stakeholders in the treatment of public authorities is seen as a factor of macro-political stability more than a means to resolve conflicts through negotiation and coordination of interests.
Contemporary Russian corporatism is closest to the & quot-Asian"- rather than & quot-Western"- type of government corporatism. It is characterized by the dominant position of the political structures in relation to business entities, but at the same time and by formula & quot-joint management with the government& quot-. Features of corporatism, emerging in contemporary Russia, are manifested in the spread of patron-client relations, domination of big business over small and medium-sized business structures in political interactions system. This trend shifts the balance of formalized and non-formalized methods of influence on political decision-making in favor of informal methods.
At the same time the latest stage in the development of political interaction between government and corporations (from the beginning of the 2000s.) is characterized by a change of the methods and procedures for interactions. Since the beginning of the Russian President V.V. Putin'-s election was announced the policy of & quot-equidistance"- from the business. In a place of the administrative comes political-economic type of control.
Significantly are changing intra-elite relationship lines: if at the initial stages of becoming a contemporary model was dominated contradiction — confrontation between the political-administrative and oligarchic elites, in the process of transformation of the ruling elite in multi-polar & quot-ensemble"- centers of power it is replaced competition formed on the principle of the oligarchic clans. In the foreground there is the struggle for access to key resources of government [22, p. 144−174]. Strategies for business-subjects in the political interaction characterized by lobbying business and representation of interests in government agencies, creation of favorable themselves formal and informal institutions of coordination of interests. During the years of the first presidency of Vladimir Putin (2000−2004) in Russia increased the size of the ruling elite and the representation of the business elite in the higher echelons of the government structures (from 1. 6% to 11. 3%). In contemporary Russia a third of the regional deputies are the representatives of big business, as a rule, corporative business [23, p. 184]. According to the ranking-2015 of & quot-Forbes"- magazine, in Russia there are 88 billionaires . These examples demonstrate the strengthening of the symbolic capital of the Russian big business.
The interaction of Russian big business with the government structures characterized by the institutional compromise and informal agreement on the admissibility of selective violations of legal norms, thus maintained the balance of political interests. This model creates the possibility of failure to comply laws and formalized rules. As a result there is implemented an informal exchange of political resources with public authorities. There are parallel institutional modes of political interaction between the government and big business in Russia. One and the same object of relations between business and government, the same interactions are regulated heterogeneous institutional orders and varying degrees of legality. Common to all business-subjects government measures to strengthen of corporatism in Russia contribute to the consolidation of the Russian big business. Such measures that promote the institutionalization of Russian corporatism are the establishment of formalized structures of direct political representation and legal regulation of non-formalized relationships. Russian big business-subjects have small influence on Russian government policy. Among the reasons of such phenomena there is the initial stage of Russian civil society development and some vacuum in the federal legislation.
Business associations are interpreted as one of the institutional forms of cooperation to achieve the common goal on the basis of a compromise of interests. Business associations operate like the form of commerce chambers, trade and industry groups, professional associations, and federations of manufacturers, associations of small and medium-sized businesses. Their presence indicates the maturity of a sector and/or business industry. This means that its representatives see themselves not only as competitors but also as colleagues, aware of the existence of common goals and interests, which protect in the face government together is easier.
Under the Russian Civil Code and the Russian Federal Laws & quot-About Nonprofit Organizations& quot- and & quot-About Public Associations& quot- there are not mentioned business associations. They exist in different
organizational and legal forms (from NGOs to commercial structures known as & quot-union"-, & quot-association"-, and others.
Despite the statement of Russian President for supporting of business associations, government officials on the ground are showing a lack of interest in their creation. Impede the development some factors: (1) the lack of financial resources- (2) the close relationship of many business associations with political structures that deprive them of their independence- (3) the strong dependence of businesses from their leaders, which impedes the effective lobbying of interests of industries or sectors of the economy as a whole.
Analyzing the formats and strategies of different actors, we can suggest recommendations to subjects of political interaction of government and corporative business structures: (1) it is necessary to create institutional forms of direct business representation in government agencies at the normative regulation of informal practices- (2) it is should to develop procedures for public debate when discussing the most important issues of the political process- (3) it is expedient adopted of the Russian Federal Law & quot-About Lobbying& quot-- (4) it is time to establishment of permanent consultative and expert councils of the business representatives, researches and NGOs at the Russian Federal Assembly, which will have casting vote in decision-making laws in their field of sector interest.
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Information about the author
Khalilov Timur A., Science Editor, Scientific Journal & quot-Historical and Social-Educational Ideas& quot-, Krasnodar, Russia, tkhalilov86@gmail. com
Received: 25th Feb. 2016
Информация об авторе
Халилов Тимур Александрович, научный журнал «Историческая и социально-образовательная мысль», г. Краснодар, Россия tkhalilov86@gmail. com
Получена: 25 февраля 2016
For article citation: Khalilov T.A. Effectiveness of Для цитирования статьи: Khalilov T.A. Effec-
government and corporative business political tiveness of government and corporative busi-
cooperation in post-soviet Russia: comparative ness political cooperation in post-soviet Russia:
analysis. Krasnodar. Istoricheskaya i sotsial'-no- comparative analysis. Krasnodar. Istoricheskaya
obrazovatel'-naya mysl'-= Historical and Social Ed- i sotsial'-no-obrazovatel'-naya mysl'-= Historical
ucational Ideas. 2016. Tom 8. № 2. Vol. 1. a nd Social Educational Ideas. 2016. Tom 8. №
Pp. 87−93. 2. Vol. 1. Pp. 87−93.
doi: 10. 17 748/2075−9908−2016−8-2/1−87−93. [en] doi: 10. 17 748/2075−9908−2016−8-2/1−87−93. [en]